The Origenic doctrine of the Pre-existence of souls in relation to the Christian Canon by Tzouramani, Evgenia & Terezis, Christos
The Origenic doctrine of the Pre-existence of souls 
in relation to the Christian Canon 
Evgenia TZOURAMANI- Christos TEREZIS 
Universidad de Patras 
Resumen 
En este trabajo se intenta analizar el tema cosmológico y antropológico de la 
preexistencia de las almas, relacionado con el espacio tangible y los cuerpos humanos en la 
obra de Orígenes. Sin embargo, nuestra intención no es demostrar si son correctas o no las tesis 
del teólogo de Alejandría, desde el punto de vista del cristianismo, sino proyectar las 
condiciones históricas dentro de las cuales fueron expuestas. Presentamos de forma sinóptica 
las posibles influencias de Platón, así como las opiniones relativas expresadas por otros 
teólogos de su época. Nuestra tesis es que las divergencias de Orígenes con las enseñanzas 
cristianas se deben sobre todo a que él mismo se encargó de examinar temas que hasta su época 
nQ habían sido analizados sistemáticamente. 
Abstract 
In this paperthere is an attempt to examine the cosmological and anthropological issue 
on the souls' preexistence in relation to the tangible universe and the human bodies in 
Orígenes' work. Our target is defmitely not to show whether the theologian' s wiewpoints from 
Alexandria are correct or not but to bring forward the historie terms within wich he formulated 
them. We present bis potential influence by Plato himself as well as sorne other views by sorne 
other theologians of his era. W e support that Orígenes' deflections from Christian teaching are 
due to the fact that he tried to explain issues wich had not been systematically developed. 
Palabras clave: Alma, cuerpo, creación. 
Introduction 
In this wider context of Christian thought the field of anthropology emerges 
in the 2nd century. In general terms Christian Anthropology is engaged with every 
feature which is related to the material and spiritual constitution of man. More 
precisely, Christian Anthropology studies the earthly activities as much as the 
orientation of man regarding his communication with God. Therefore multifaceted 
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approach of being is attempted. The latter is studied as a biological and spiritual being 
and as an entity which communicates and defines itself through its reference to God. 
What exactly man is, constitutes a question which cannot be fully answered. However 
this question is related with the theory of man being an image of God in the world 1• 
One of the issues which are related of the quest of Christian Anthropology is the 
nature of the human soul. The issue above has been thoroughly examined by Origen. 
This issue has already been raised in classic antiquity mostly by Plato whom Origen 
seems to follow in quite a few points. An inquiring reader could ha ve resource to the 
dialogues of Menon Phaedo and Phaedro to acquire a global view of Plato's 
standpoint regarding the relation of the soul with the body. This kind if approach will 
be sufficient ground for one to comprehend Origen's understanding of Plato's 
viewpoint. It should also be mentioned that Plato not only presents this topic in a 
wider philosophical context but also he relates it with theological references. This is 
because Plato maintains that souls originate from the metaphysical world where they 
co-existed before they were incorporated with the archetypical Forms of whom they 
had full Knowledge. This notion that the embodiment of souls is equal to captivity or 
punishment will shed light to what will be mentioned below about the Athenian 
philosopher. Namely he reviews the quantitive aspect of the issue which indirectly 
can lead to a limitation ofGod's omnipotence. 
The issue of the origin of souls, their infusion into the body and their relation 
to it may, in the first instance, appear as a theologoumenon of marginal significance 
for the articulation of the Canon of Christian faith. However, a closer study reveals 
that it has crucial implications in connection with a dualistic nature of creation, 
predestination, theodicy and Incamation. Thus, the suggestion of the pre-existence of 
souls, their fall and their penal enclosure in the body by Origen was legitimately the 
object of a scrutinizing exainination by Church Fathers, who eventually rendered it 
heterodox in the fifth Ecumenical council of Constantinople in 553 A.D. However, 
for an inquiring mind the stem formulation of the eleven anathemas appearing in the 
official acts of the Council will not suffice2• That is the theme which penetrates the 
following study in which light will be shed to the issue of the pre-existence of souls. 
This examination will be treated as an integral part of the original theory which 
involves the fall as well as the penal embodiment of souls so as to obtain a global and 
complete view. This examination, for reasons of clarity, will follow the threefold 
l. See, Paul EVDOKIMOV, La femme et le salut du monde. Etude d' Anthropologie 
Chrétienne sur les charismes de la femme, Casterman, París, 1958. 
2. Justin Ep. Ad Mennam (Mansi IX 533) 396-7 Frag. 23aKoetschau. 
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di vis ion of the second anathema of the fifth Council in Constantinople namely the 
pre-existence, the fall and the penal embodiment of souls. lt is not however of 
marginal importance that soul for Origen even during its fall maintains at least sorne 
K.ind of affmity with «Verbo Dei». Soul is therefore logical because it is in God's 
image: 
«Si ergo caelestes virtutes intel/ectualis lucís, id est, divinae naturae, per 
hoc quod sapientiae et sanctificationis participan!, participium sumunt, et 
humana anima ejusdem lucís et sapientiae participium sumit, erunt et ita 
sunt unius naturae secum invicem uniusque substantiae. Incorruptae autem 
sunt et immortales caelestes virtutes, immortalis sine dubio et incorrupta 
erit etiam animae humanae substantia. Non solum autem, sed quoniam ipsa 
Patris et Filli et Spiritus Sancti natura, cujus solius intel/ectualis lucís 
universa creatura participium trahit, incorrupta est et aeterna, va/de 
consequens et necessarium est etiam omnem substantiam, quae aeternae 
illius naturae participium trahit, perdurare etiam ipsam semper et 
incorruptibilem et aeternam, ut divinae bonitatis aeternitas etiam in eo 
intelligatur., .. dum et aeterni sunt hi, qui ejus beneficia consequuntun>. 
(De Prin., IV. 4.9) 
F ollowing the scope of study indicated above, Origen' s doctrine of the pre­
existence of souls will be examined according to its original formulation in his 
writings. In addition, the arguments of his detractors with reference to the 
implications of the doctrine and the orthodox altemative, will maintain a balanced 
exposition of the issue. Finally, a closer insight into the conditions, and the relevant 
mind set upon which this hypothesis was formulated, will shed light on the issue of 
the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of its nature. 
According to Origen's exposition of pre-existence, all rational creatures 
(rationabiles creaturae )3 were created at once, in the beginning (in principio )4 pure, 
equal and alike (aequales creavit omnes ac similes)5• They were without a body of 
3.De Prin. 11.9.6. 
4. ibid. See also De Prin. 11.9.1: "EV Tfl E1tlVOOUflÉVIl apxí]''. 
5. ibid. See also De Prin. 11.9.4. 'quod scilicet in his quae facta sunt, nihil injustum, nihil 
fortuitum videatur, sed omnia ita esse ut aequitiatis ac justitiae regula expetit doceantur 
("whence it will be apparent that in the things which were made there was nothing unrighteous, 
nothing accidental but all will be shown to be such as the principie of equity and righteousness 
demands".) (trans by G.W. Butterworth, Origen on First Principies, Society For Promoting 
Christian Knowledge, London, 1936, p. 1 32). 
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matter, restricted in number so they can suffice only for the ordering of the world6• 
They all formed a unity by reason of the identity of their essence and power and by 
their union with the Know ledge of God7• The soul of J esus was among them in equal 
union8• For Origen, there was never a time when God did not practice His attribute as 
Creator9 and, subsequently, Origen declares that there was always a prefiguration of 
the present world in an immaterial form present in the Wisdom10• 
Such a novel idea regarding Christian Theology was expected to receive 
various reactions. To Origen's detriment the overwhelming majority criticized 
harshly, the theory of pre-existence. Among these, Epiphanius, bishop of Salamis in 
Cyprus, towards the end of the fourth century argued that souls did not exist prior to 
their embodimerit' 1• In support of this he cites Gen 2:23 
"Then the man said, 
'This at last is bone of m y bones 
and flesh of m y flesh; 
she shall be called W oman 
Because she was taken out of Man"' 
6. De Prin. II.9 .l. 'Mensura vera materiae corporali consequenter aptabitur; quam utique 
tantam a Deo esse creatam credendum est, quantam sibi sciret ad ornatum mundi posse 
sufficere. Here G. W. Butterworth wrongly argues that Eusebius in the Greek text "·rocroútov 
apt9f.1ÓV 'tú) pouA'JÍf.lU'tl UU'l:OÚ U1t00''t'JÍO'Ul1:0V eeóv VOlft . V OUO'l . V ÓO'OV 110ÚVU1:0 OtapKÉO'at" 
renders the restriction of the number of intelligences to God' s ability to control them and thus 
he construes Origen correctly. (Origen on First Principies p.xxxiii, l 29). However the verb 
OtapKú> means to be sufficient and the verb TJOUVU'l:O can be taken as impersonal and therefore 
instead ofGod it takes as a sutíject the final infinitive OtapKecrm. Thus it is translated 'as many 
as could suffice'. 
7. This piece of text is not an extract from De Principiis but it is part of the second anathema 
against Origen, decreed by the Second Council ofConstantinople. However, Butterworth cites 
it because 'for the most part it is in Origen's own words' (O.O.F.P. p.125). 
8. De Prin. 11.6.3. 
9. This piece of text is also not included in De Principiis but it is cited in Koetschou's ed p. 
65 note on 1.8 and also in Butterworth's translation (O.O.F.P. p.42). 
10. This text is also part ofKoetschou's edition without existing in the actual text of De 
Principüs. 
11.  Epiphanius, Phanarion 64, 26 (GCS 312,442). This is also supported by Theophilus E p. 
Paschalis (404) (=Jerome Ep lOO ) 12 (CSEL 55, 226). 
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Thus for Epiphanius the body existed nnited with the soul prior to the FalP2 
and not befare as an independent entity. Moreover, Theophilus, in arder to support the 
parallel existence of body and soul from the beginning of creation, quotes Zechariah 
12:1 
" . .. the Lord ... formed the spirit of man within him." 
Subsequently, he contends that if the spirit of man pre-existed and was 
incorporated in man after its cosmic fall, then the prophet should rather ha ve said that 
God "enclosed", or "cast down", the spirit13. Furthermore, Theophilus in 400 A.D. 
strongly disapproves of Origen's contention that God created as many souls as He 
could control. Instead of this, Theophilus supports that God made the number of 
creatures that He "ought to have made"14 since God is not controlled by matter15• In 
addition to this, Jerome at the end of the fourth century introduced the discussion 
about the implications of the soul of Jesus being assimilated in equal union with all 
the other souls, which later in the fall would be relegated in the state of angels, 
humans or even demons16• This would jeopardize the beliefin the divinity of Jesus 
and subsequently it would question the redemptive character of His Incamation. 
Finally, later systematic theology propounded that souls have their proper role only 
in union with the body and not as independent existences. In the latter case, souls 
would have no individuality, no personal human identity, and therefore they would 
be in an unnatural state of existence17• 
However, the theory which was most favourable among the Fathers, and 
which was regarded as the orthodox one, was creationism. This doctrine propounds 
that God creates a new soul for each human individual. Then the soul is inserted by 
God into the body as it is formed in the maternal womb. Thus soul and body are 
created together. This theory was supported by Lactantius18, Jerome19 ,A.mbrosé0 and 
12. Epiphanius, Ep. and Iohannem Episcopum (=Jerome, Eo 51) 5 (CSEL 54, 403-4) as 
quoted by E.A. Clark in The Origenistic Controversy, Princeton University Press, 1992, p.95. 
13. Theophilus, Fr�gment 2, Ep. synodalis prima. 
14. Theophilus, Ep. pascha/is (402) (=Jerome Ep.98) 17 (CSEL 55, 201-2). 
15. Theophilus, Ep; paschalis (402) (=Jerome Ep.98) 18 (CSEL 55, 203). 
16. Jerome Apo/ogia II,4 (CCL 79,36). 
17. J. E. RO Y CE, "Origin ofthe human soul" in New Catholic Encyclopaedia, XIII, p.471. 
18. Lactantius, Inst. 2.12,3. 
19. Jerome Adv Ruf3.23 and Apol III 28 (79,100). 
20. Ambrose De Noe et acra 1.4.9. 
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others21• 
In contrast to creationism was a less fortunate theory called traducianism. 
According to this theory, the soul is contained in bodily sperm (tradux, seed or 
sprout) and it is transmitted by organic generation. This doctrine was presented by 
Tertullian, who argued that Adam's soul alone was created by God, whereas all the 
other souls were generated through the paternal seed22 .Apollinorists hold a versified 
traducianistic theory consisting in the generation .of children's souls from the souls 
of parents, a theory which was also open to grave objections23• Finally, traducianism 
was condemned by Pope Anastasius II in 49824 ,on the grounds that the generative act 
of the parents is only the extrinsic cause of the origin of soul. In the orthodox 
doctrine, the soul is the object of an immediate and direct creation only by God25• 
In our endeavour to attain a more objective and clear insight to the conditions 
leading to the formulation of the doctrine of pre-existence by Origen, it should be 
underscored that Ante-Nicean Christianity had not yet established any relevant 
dogma. More precise! y, even in the fifth century the Church still held no fmn position 
upon the subject. This argument can, on its own, be sound enough to acquit Origen 
ofheresy. Pamphilius in the late fourth century writes that, since the Chur.ch has not 
pmnounced an opinion on this matter, it is unreasonable to label so�one who 
entertains a different opinion a heretic26• The lack of any relevant dogma on the part 
of the Church is supported by Rufinus who because of this makes allowances for 
theological debate27• More important is that the silence of the Church is also claimed 
21. Lactantius, De opif. Dei 19. 
22. TertullianDe anima 23-27,36. Others that seem to have favoured traducianism are Gre­
gory ofNyssa (De hom. ipit 29) and Faustus of Riez (Epist 3). 
23. The implications ofthis theory are summarised in the fact that soul is simple and spiritual 
and thus it cannot be compounded from something received from each parent or in the case of 
the parents cannot be divided. For further discussion, see J.E. ROYCE, "Origin ofthe human 
soul", inNC.E,. Vol. XIII.p.470. 
24. The text in which this condemnation appears is Anastasius' epistle to the Galician bishops 
( The Oxford dictionary of the Christian Church, ed by E A Livingstone p.l 636) Traducianism 
was a1so rejected by Augustine (Epist. 190.4.14). 
25. For further discussion regarding the time ofinfusion ofthe soul to the body according to 
Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and modero embryology, see J.E. ROYCE, "Origin ofthe Human 
Sou1", in N C. E. XIII, p. 4 71. 
26. Pamphilius, Apología 9 (PG 17, 606). 
27. Rujinus, Apología ad Anastasium 6 (CCL20,27). However, according to E Clark, "Jero­
me tried to malee it sound as ifthe Church had ru1ed in favor of creationism". (Contra Joannem 
22 PQL 23,389). The same writer also argues that in 412 A.D. after the heat ofthe controversy 
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by Origen, who is left with an open space for speculation28• Even Augustine -
considerably later than Origen- after having discarded traducianism, was oscillating 
between the doctrines of pre-existence and creationism29• The latter theory, in 
particular, seemed for him incapable of explaining the transmission of original sin30• 
On the other hand, in De Libero abritrio he hints at the pre-existence of souls and 
intimates that it was in our pre-embodied state that we once possessed virtue31• The 
example of Augustine affirms the highly speculative clima te surrounding the issue of 
the origin of the soul even in a period very el ose to the 5th Ecumenical Council of 
Constantinople. The obscurity of the Bible also did not point to any specific theory, 
but it was a ductible basis for various constructions and thus religious speculation was 
encouraged. 
In addition, to this, during the period in which Origen was formulating his 
system, there was no investigation of the various heresies such as Pelagianism or 
Arianism which would preoccupy the fourth- and fifth- century theologians. Thus, 
there was nothing to compel Origen to be more precise and cautious in the structure 
of his conceptual framework32.Therefore, in this context, he very early engaged in a 
free and unrestricted quest to explain the state.of the present world. The failure of his 
suggestion to be a part of the Christian Canon..three centuries later seems to be more 
an anachronism than a just synodical condemnation. 
Secondly, the issue conceming to what extent Origen's doctrine of pre­
existence is the fmished product of a dogma tic affirmation or a tentative suggestiori 
has recently occupied scholars. This view is also strongly founded on textual grounds. 
Origen writes that with reference to rational natures he spoke in a general way, by 
had died, Jerome became more cautious Ep. 126,1 (CSEL 56,143). (The Origenistic 
Controversy p.I2). 
28. De Prin pref.5 "non satis manifesta praedicatione distinguitur" ("all this is not very 
clearly defined in the teaching") trans. by Butterworth O.O.F.P.p.4. 
29. Augustine (Retract. 1.1.3). 
30. Augustine (Epist 166.8). 
3 l. Augustine (Delibero arbitrio 1.12.24). On Augustine's view ofthe origin ofsou1s, see 
R. HANSON, "Christian P1atonism in Origen and Augustine", in Origeniana Tertia, R. Hanson 
and H. Crouzel (eds.) 1 98 1 ,  p.222. 
32. H. CROUZEL (Origen pp. 172-3) and R. CADIOU (Origen: His life at A/exandria, 
London, Herder Book Company 10, (1944), pp.l47-8) are unanimous in this matter. 
Flor. 11., 18 (2007), pp. 421-431. 
428 E. TZOURAMANI y CH. TEREZIS- THE ORIGENIC ... 
logical inference rather than by precise dogmatic statemene3• In another part Origen 
becomes more precise in his contention by writing that, in fear of his views being 
taken as heretical and contrary to the faith of the Church (heretica haec et contra 
fidem ecclesiasticam)3\ he will speak by discussing and investigating rather than by 
laying down fixed and certain conclusions35• In other parts of De Principiis Origen 
also presents the contemporary speculation regarding the origin of soul36 and invites 
his readers to be critica! and discover the truth themselves37• 
Scholars have almost reached unanimity regarding the speculative and 
investigative character ofOrigen 's understanding of the world. J. Armantage affirms 
that De Principiis does not present a basic statement of Origen's view of religion, 
in te grating and specifying the relationship between the church and the world38• 
Instead, C. Rabinowitz talks about "Origen' s speculative investigation of Christia­
nity", the beauty of which "líes in its creativity and not in its dogmatic nature"39• In 
the same manner L. G. Patterson affirms that Origen intended "forcing attention on 
significant questions rather than winning acceptance of the solutions he proposed to 
them"40• Finally, J Danielou contends that Origen, in comparison to Clement, makes 
33. De Prin 1.7.1 " ... generali nobis sermofte digesta sint, per consequentiam magis inte­
llectum quam definito dogmate pertractata atque discussa de rationabilibus maturis . . .  " (trans. 
by Butterworth O.O.F.P.p.59). 
34. De Prin. 1.6.1. 
35. ibid " ... discutientibus magis et pertractanibus quam pro certo ac definito statuentibus" 
(trans. by Butterworth O.O.F.P.p.52)). 
36. De Prin pref 5. In book two of his Commentary on the Song ofSongs(8, 146, 3-4) Origen 
again addresses the matter by providing the same summary of the three views on the coming 
of the soul to the body. After stating the traducianíst position, he poses an altemative: soul 
comes from the outside and is p1aced in the body which has already been prepared and formed 
in the fema1e womb (parato iam et formato intra víscera muliebra corpore ). Then Origen goes 
on to ask whether the soul in that case comes new1y created or had been created earlier (utrum 
super creata ... an prius et olim facta) and for sorne reason now assumes a body. At this point 
he do es not pursue the question whereas in De Principiis he argues for soul 's pre-existent state. 
37. !bid, pref. 9. 
38. J. ARMANT AGE, "The best of both worlds: Origen' s view on religion and resurrection" 
in Origeniana prima, Universitit di Bari, 1 97 5, p.34 5. 
39. C.E. RABINOWITZ, "Personal and cosmic sa1vation in Origen", in Vigiliae Christianae 
38 (1 984), p. 328. 
40. L. G. P A TTERSON, "Who are the Opponents in Methodius' De resurrectione", in Studia 
Patrística XIX, p.22 9. 
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more room for personal speculation41 while R Daly blames "over-enthusiastic 
Origenists for turning Origen's speculation into doctrine42.As one can see, there is 
ample textual evidence and scholarly consensus with regard to Origen's character of 
this doctrine of the pre-existence of souls. Origen may not ha ve considered it as a 
compelling and authoritative theory at all, but as an impressive notion which fitted 
nicely in his systematic view of the world. Origen's ímpetus to taxinomize and 
interconnect all the loose ends in his world-view may account for the systematic 
incorporation and operation of pre-exístence in the whole scheme, although nowhere 
is it said to be a prime contention of his. Of course, no one can accuse anyone of 
heresy and how much to condemn him for bringing into discussion -particularly when 
this is made clear in the preface43 -a theory, regardless of its unorthodox features. The 
Church, after all, befare affirming u pon any subj ect of faith, allowed a long period in 
which Fathers were discussing the rightness of it, producing altematives or deviating 
from the more accepted solution. In this free and fruitful discourse, Origen's 
suggestion of the pre-existence of souls was an essential part which tried to explain 
the inadequacies of the other methods, towards a synodical decision. And for this, 
Origen cannot be charged with heresy. 
Thirdly, a maj or stumbling block in Origen' s of pre-e-xistence is its opposition 
to the orthodox dogma of the creation of the world by God ex nihilo. According to 
Origen, God had created in the beginning a supply of souls which later received 
angelic, human or demonic bodies, according to their merit. However, regarding the 
time occurrence of the creation of souls- which seems here to be the issue of dispute 
-Origen is misunderstood44• Origen had conceived God as perpetua! Creator from the 
41. J. DANIELOU, Gospel message and Hellenistic Culture, trans. J.A. Baker, The 
Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1973, p. 155. 
42. R. DAL Y, "Origen studies and Pierre Nautin's Origene" in Tñeological Studies 39 
(1978), p.509. On the same subject, see also R. A. NORRlS, God and World in Early Christian 
Tñeology, Adam and Charles Black, London, 1966, p. 106. 
43. De Prin. pref5.9. 
44. Justin and Athenagoras argue that a commitment to the idea of pre-existent matter in 
general terms, does not rule out a doctrine of creation ex nihilo. (Justin II Apology 6, 
Athenagoras, Leg 10.1 ). God could have created matter prior to its ordering and arranging. See 
N .J. TORCHIA, "Theories of Creation in the Second Century Apologists and their Middle 
Platonic Backgrounds" in Studia Patrística XXVI p.l 94. lt should be noted that the issue of 
the infmite character ofmatter in Justine's work is deemed to be one of the most difficult. The 
Christian theologian suggests that the account of creation in Genesis bears a lot of similarities 
to the respective account of Plato in Timeus' dialogue. While proceeding further, Justine 
presents God to ha ve ordered pre-existent matter. Justine does not mention, however, whether 
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beginning of his existence. He contends that if one argues that the creation did not 
exist from the beginning, then this means that there was a time that God was not 
Creator. Subsequently, this implies a change and a probable improvement in the 
nature ofGod - later as Creator which is incompatible with the unchangeable divine 
substance. In Origen's words: 
"To prove that God is almighty we must assume the existence of the 
universe. For if anyone would have it that certain ages, or periods of 
time . . .  elapsed during which the present creation did not exist, he would 
undoubtedly prove that in those ages or periods God was not almighty, 
but that he afterwards became almighty from the time when he began to 
have creatures over whom he could exercise power45". 
Thus, Origen conceives creation as a continua! emanation from God, co­
etemal with Him. In this regard, G. Bostock writes that Origen is influenced by the 
Hermetic Tradition which describes creation as rays flowing perpetually from an 
etemal sun (God)46• Therefore, f.or Origen creation in general is not conceived as an 
act time-definable or time-limit€d. It is more an idea free of temporal restrictions. 
Thus, the pre-existence of souls, despite its apparent clash with the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo, is not really heretical, if one considers seriously Origen' s particular 
mindset. For him it was natural for God to have created from the beginning of His 
existence. If there was any time that there was no creation, then at that time God 
would not have been a Creator. But this would imply a change to the immutable and 
complete divine substance which God holds etemally. Thus, if one accepts that God 
has not undergone any change in His status, he is also bound to accept that God 
practised all His di vine attributes from the beginning of His existence. Therefore, 
there was no pagan or polytheistic feature behind Origen' s notion of existence of soul 
prior to its joining a body. On the contrary, his syllogism was based on logical 
inference. However, the obvious dualism which underlies Origen's notion of the first 
the creator of this matter is God or not. Nevertheless, taking into consideration Justine 
standpoint as a who1e it is possib1e that he argues that God originally created matter and he 
ordered it later on. 
45. De Prin, 1.2.10 "ideo ut omnipotens ostendatur Deus, omnia subsistere necesse 
ser ... "(trans. by Butterworth G.W. O.O.F.P.p.23). 
46. Behind the Hermetic tradition líes the solar theology of ancient Egypt. See G. BOSTOCK 
"Origen's Philosophy of Creation" in Origeniana Quinta, R.J. Daly (ed.), Leuven University 
Press, 1992, p.255. The same parallel occurs also in Origen (De Prin 1,1.6.). 
Flor. Il., 18 (2007), pp. 421-431. 
E. TZOURAMAN I y CH. TEREZIS- THE ORIGENIC ... 431 
creation of heavenly entities and the latter inferior creation of the material world will 
be the issue of another study. 
In conclusion, it was demonstrated that the doctrine of the prior existence of 
souls by Origen cannot be rendered heretical. First of all, because when it was 
expounded by Origen there was not yet any orthodox dogma established by the 
Church. Thus, everyone could speculate freely and of course this would not make one 
a heretic. Secondly, there is no evidence that Origen's theory was more than a 
speculation which took a doctrinal character due to his ímpetus to systemize. Thirdly, 
even if pre-existence was a principal contention of Origen, his Christian motives to 
vindicate God's omnipotence and Justice in the way he thought it was apposite, is 
enough to acquit him of heresy. The inadequacies of his theory if they are seen under 
this perspective are rather the price that a great innovator and critica! thinker had to 
pay than heretical features. 
Moreover, it should be noted that in th 7th cent. AC. Maximus the Confessor, 
in his workDe variis difficilibus locis, attempted a systematic approach of the theory 
of Origen. The subject of universal restitution (mwKa-rácr-racr�) was of prime 
importance in Maximus' approach. After the doctrinal evolution in the period of the 
fiV6.centuries after the original exposition of Origen, Maximus attempte..ito refute 
sorne of Origen's positions focusing mainly on methodological issues. 
Flor. Il., 18 (2007), pp. 421-431. 
